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HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORY AND
PROJECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY+
THOMAS C. WRIGHT*
INTRODUCTION
Human rights as a concept in Western political thought has been estab-
lished for several centuries, subject to interpretation according to changing
times. However, observance of the individual liberties that constitute the es-
sence of the traditional notion of human rights has varied according to time
and place. Within Latin America the extent to which human rights are hon-
ored or abrogated likewise changes according to circumstances, making gen-
eralizations about the human rights situation in the region as a whole diffi-
cult to make.
Nonetheless, one can cite two important constants that have influenced
the observance of human rights in twentieth century Latin America. The first
of these is that the privileged members of society enjoy more protection of
their individual liberties than do the less privileged. The more wealthy,
white, and culturally mainstream one is, the more likely one's human rights
will be respected by governments. The poor, the dark (Indian, African-
descended, or mixed ethnicity), and the culturally marginalized (illiterates,
speakers of Indian languages) will consistently suffer deprivation of the
rights their countries' constitutions bestow upon them. Not only will these
rights be trampled at the will of the powerful, but very commonly the have-
nots do not even know that they, in theory, are endowed with rights owing to
their condition as humans. This is most likely a universal condition of hu-
man rights observance, one that is reflected in our own history and contem-
porary life in the United States.
The second constant is that individual liberties are much more secure in
+ Portions of this article were published in Proceedings from the Fifteenth Anniversary
Workshops and Conference of the West Virginia Consortium for Faculty and Course Devel-
opment in International Studies (Sophia Peterson ed., 1996).
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authored with Rody Ofiate, examines human rights under the Pinochet dictatorship.
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climates of social and political peace than in periods of social and political
conflict. In periods of rapid social change accompanied by political agitation
or turmoil, human rights are likely to be sacrificed in the intergroup struggle
for advantage or victory. The degree to which these rights are abrogated,
moreover, depends on the intensity and magnitude of the conflict.
The 1970s and 1980s were the period in which Latin America became
known for massive and institutionalized human rights abuses, symbols of
which were the Chilean DINA,' the Salvadoran death squads, and the Argen-
tine "dirty war."' A historical overview of human rights observance since the
Latin American countries gained independence from Spain and Portugal
provides a perspective for analyzing the excesses of the 1970s and 1980s and
projecting the human rights climate for the twenty-first century.
I. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
During the three centuries of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule the
Western concepts of individual liberties took only shallow root. While colo-
nial Latin America produced crusaders for the rights of the Indian popula-
tion, most notably Father Bartolom6 de Las Casas, Spanish and Portuguese
law was less concerned with the individual's rights vis-A-vis the state than
was English law. Thus, despite the usual language of their new constitutions,
the independent republics of Latin America did not draw on the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of human rights to the extent that the United States did.
The period from independence (a process completed by 1825) to the end
of the nineteenth century was an era of essentially uncontested upper class
political hegemony. Despite the rise of the occasional populist caudillo, or
strong man, there were few serious attempts to carry out fundamental altera-
tions of the economic, social, and political order.' During this time, the ma-
jorities of the countries' populations were completely excluded from the po-
litical process, education, economic opportunity, and from cultural
participation in national life. To the upper classes, the notion that an Ay-
mara-speaking Bolivian Indian or a freed slave in Brazil enjoyed the unal-
ienable rights of expression, assembly, or due process of law was laughable.
Particularly by the late nineteenth century, when the Latin American elites
had adopted the social and racial theories of Spencer and Gobineau to jus-
1. DINA (Direcci6n de Intelegencia Nacional) was Chile's secret police during the Pino-
chet dictatorship. See PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES:
CHILE UNDER PINOCHET 90-114 (1991).
2. The "dirty war" was the repression carried out by the military government that ruled
Argentina between 1976 and 1983 against urban guerrillas and the left in general. See gener-
ally MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSEN, DOSSIER SECRETO: ARGENTINA'S DESAPARECIDOS AND THE
MYTH OF THE DIRTY WAR (1983); IAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S
DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990).
3. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL & NEILL MACAULAY, THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN
AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2nd ed. 1994).
4. Herbert Spencer and Count Arthur Joseph de Gobineau were social theorists whose
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tify their position in society, hardly anyone gave any thought to the abstract
concept that the lower orders had rights, and the upper classes by and large
acted accordingly. Thus, if the masses were trampled underfoot or denied the
rights with which their constitutions endowed them, few people noticed.
Political contests were among elite factions-the people who, by their
social standing, wealth, and power were supposed to have human rights.
While civil liberties were not well developed in most countries, at least for
the wealthy and influential a reasonable degree of personal safety pertained.
When conflict occurred among elite factions, when coups took place and
civil wars broke out, the leaders on the losing side were rarely massacred,
tortured, or imprisoned for long periods. Given the frequency of such low-
intensity political conflict, Latin America early on developed informal but
highly civilized rules of the game for losers: cashiering from the army, loss
of office, and perhaps a period of exile. These humane rules did not apply to
the lower orders who constituted the cannon fodder in intra-elite conflicts.
II. THE ONSET OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CONFLICT, 1900-1959
The creation and incipient political awakening of an industrial-style
working class, along with the expansion of a middle class, underlay the onset
of a different kind of political conflict during this period-conflict generated
by the desire of the new social groups for entrde into the political system in
pursuit of economic and social benefits. This process began around the turn
of the century in some countries, including Mexico, Argentina, and Chile
where workers organized without benefit of supportive labor law.' When
they used the strike in pursuit of improvements in wages or working condi-
tions or as a protest, the normal response was to use the military and police
to suppress the workers by brute force.6 The economic disruption caused by
World War I, which staggered Latin America's export-oriented economies,
intensified this conflict as working and middle class people lost jobs or ex-
perienced wage cuts.7 After a brief economic recovery in the 1920s, the
Great Depression exacerbated the problems of unemployment and underem-
ployment. Meanwhile, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Russian
Revolution of 1917 had provided inspiration for the working class as well as
new forms of union and political organization.8
works were influential in late nineteenth century Latin America. See generally JAY RUMNEY,
HERBERT SPENCER'S SOCIOLOGY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL THEORY (1965);
MICHAEL D. BIDDISS, FATHER OF RACIST IDEOLOGY: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
COUNT GOBINEAU (1970).
5. See VICTOR ALBA, POLITICS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 25-34
(Carol de Zapata trans., 1968).
6. See id. at 221-24, 241, 246-50, 263-64.
7. For the example of Argentina, see David Rock, Argentina from the First World War to
the Revolution of 1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1870-1930, at 419-
448 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1984).
8. See generally ALAN KNIGHT, THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1986); JOHN MASON HART,
20001
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It is reasonable to assume that in this era, routine and unpublicized hu-
man rights violations in rural areas continued unabated; but the proliferation
of leftist political parties, protest movements, and strikes in the 1910s,
1920s, and 1930s, particularly in the more developed countries, posed seri-
ous dilemmas for the elites. Could they continue the earlier methods of re-
taining control by naked force, or would some sort of accommodation have
to be made with the burgeoning political force of the working and middle
classes? This dilemma tended to divide the elites over strategy: intransigence
or preemption. In some countries, among them Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba,
accommodation was reached after periods of instability, and middle and
working class demands for participation were at least partially met by ex-
tending the franchise and enacting social security and labor laws These ac-
commodations institutionalized a system of inter-class bargaining that nor-
mally allowed for peaceful resolution of conflict through the political
process, although workers continued to die in periodic governmental repres-
sion, and leftist political leaders suffered intermittent persecution even in
those nations where they were most thoroughly incorporated into the politi-
cal system. °
In some countries, however, such mechanisms did not develop and the
old-fashioned methods of repressing the lower orders continued. "La Ma-
tanza" (the slaughter) in El Salvador in 1932 involved the killing of between
10,000 and 30,000 Indian and mestizo peasants by government troops." On
the other extreme of the developmental continuum, the protracted repression
of the powerful Argentine labor movement following the 1955 overthrow of
Juan Per6n illustrates the fragility of labor's conquests." Thus, in the initial
era of interclass conflict, between the dawn of the twentieth century and the
Cuban Revolution, human rights were continually repressed in many Latin
American countries in the interest of excluding the working and middle
classes from power so as to preserve the elites' monopoly of power and so-
cietal benefits. The level and intensity of sociopolitical conflict during this
period varied by time and place, but this conflict was to escalate dramati-
cally throughout Latin America in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.
III. THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1959-1990
In the words of journalist Herbert Matthews, a close observer of the
Latin American scene, "January 1, 1959, when Fidel Castro triumphed, be-
REVOLUTIONARY MEXICO: THE COMING AND PROCESS OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1987).
9. See Ian Roxborough, The Urban Working Class and Labour Movement in Latin Amer-
ica Since 1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 307-78.
10. See id.
11. See generally THOMAS P. ANDERSON, MATANZA: EL SALVADOR'S COMMUNIST
REVOLT OF 1932 (1971).
12. See DONALD C. HODGES, ARGENTINA, 1943-1976: THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND
RESISTANCE 32-63 (1976).
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gan a new era in Latin America."" For the next thirty years, the Cuban
Revolution was the driving force in Latin American politics. Operating as a
catalyst to mass mobilization and the radicalization of politics throughout
Latin America, Fidel Castro's revolution brought an unprecedented focus on
existing social, economic, and political problems, and inspired broad seg-
ments of the population, including many among the politically marginalized
rural masses of peasants and agricultural workers, to strive for immediate
change.
Fidel .Castro called for revolution throughout Latin America: an anti-
Yankee, socialist revolution."' He called for immediate action by declaring
that "the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution."" Referring
to the Cuban mountain range where his insurrection had been launched, Cas-
tro publicly called on revolutionaries to turn the Andes Mountains, running
from Venezuela to Chile and Argentina, into the Sierra Maestra of South
America. 6 Beyond calling for revolution, Castro aided some of the multiple
insurrections that broke out with financing, training, and arms."
But the primary influence of the Cuban Revolution was the example it
set for Latin America. According to Herbert Matthews, the Cuban Revolu-
tion was "something new, exciting, dangerous, and infectious," and this was
because it offered a model for successful insurrection as well as for national
liberation and social revolution.'8 In just three years, Cuba broke completely
with the United States, widely regarded in Latin America as the imperialist
power of the region, and freed Cuba from U.S. economic and political con-
trol, even defeating the U.S.-orchestrated Bay of Pigs invasion in April
1961.19 Castro also ended the capitalist order in Cuba, foreign-dominated and
seen by many as highly exploitive, and replaced it with a socialist system.
He conducted a thorough agrarian reform and established a regime of guar-
anteed work, fair remuneration, free health care and education, controlled
rents, and other benefits that Latin America's poor could only dream about."0
Finally, Castro did it all with panache: His personal charisma, his defiance of
the Yankee, his 1961 literacy campaign, and his maximalist style that
deemed no obstacle too great to overcome in the name of the revolution.
The timing of the Cuban Revolution, moreover, was perfect for its mes-
sage to reach into the remotest comers of Latin America. For example, the
13. HERBERT LIONEL MATTHEWS, THE CUBAN STORY 273-274 (George Braziller ed.,
1961).
14. See JUAN M. DEL AGUILA, CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTION 109-18 (3rd ed.
1993).
15. FIDEL CASTRO SPEAKS 115 (Martin Kenner & James Petras eds., 1969) (quoting The
Second Declaration of Havana (Feb. 4, 1962)).
16. See AGUILA, supra note 14.
17. See id.
18. MATrHEWS, supra note 13, at 185.
19. See generally RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., RESPONSE TO REVOLUTION: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 1959-1961 (1985); PETER WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS (1979).
20. See AGUILA, supra note 14, at 47-83.
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cheap transistor radio and the store window television set were just appear-
ing, allowing the illiterate urban and particularly the rural masses for the first
time to receive information-and the message they received from Cuba was
powerful.
In contrast to the previous period, when sociopolitical conflict had be-
come explicit and persistent, after 1959, it was epidemic. Conflict intensified
to the point that everything was at stake; not only the elites' privileges and
their political hegemony, but because the revolutionaries demanded land re-
form and some version of socialism, the elites' very existence was in-jeop-
ardy. All they had to do was look at Cuba, where the upper class was com-
pletely eliminated in the transition to socialism-mostly through exile to
Miami-to see their fate should revolution triumph.2' The armed forces
likewise only had to look at Cuba, where the regular military was disbanded
after Fidel's triumph, replaced by the "revolutionary" armed forces, to pro-
ject their future should revolution triumph."2 Furthermore, through the 1960s,
and into the 1970s and 1980s, the indications were that the wave of revolu-
tionary activity touched off by Cuba could indeed succeed. Intensification of
strikes and political violence, formation of "fidelista" political groups, radi-
calization of some of the press, leftist victories at the polls, land occupations
in the countryside, the outbreak of guerrilla movements, both rural and ur-
ban-these developments prompted military coups in many countries during
the 1960s to stop the leftward movement of the political spectrum and the
destabilization of governments.
IV. THE SOUTHERN CONE ANTIREVOLUTIONARY MILITARY REGIMES
The horrendous record of human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s
was found precisely in those countries where the movement toward revolu-
tion was most pronounced. In Uruguay, the Tupamaro urban guerrillas, or-
ganized in 1963 and actively combating the government from 1967, gained
momentum and appeared capable of overthrowing the government by the
early 1970s until a militarization of the Uruguayan government turned the
tide against them and led to the establishment of a dictatorship in 1973.3 In
Argentina, several urban guerrilla groups became active in 1969 against the
Ongania military dictatorship and fought off and on until their defeat by
1979 in the so-called "dirty war."' In these neighboring countries insurrec-
tionary victory was not implausible. Indeed, in the early 1970s many saw so-
21. See THOMAS C. WRIGHT, LATIN AMERICA IN THE ERA OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 41-
59(1991).
22. See RAFAEL FERMOSELLE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY, 1492-1986, at
266-74 (1987).
23. See JAMES KOHL, URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 172-309 (James
Kohl & John Litt eds., 1974).
24. See generally MARIA JOSE MOYANO, ARGENTINA'S LOST PATROL: ARMED STRUGGLE,
1969-1979 (1995); GUEST, supra note 2.
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cialist revolution as an immediate threat. In Chile, the 1970 election of Sal-
vador Allende on a platform of moving Chile quickly toward socialism put
revolution into the presidential palace.2 Allende's very success in bringing
the private economy under state control through accelerated agrarian reform
and an ambitious program of expropriations of industry and financial institu-
tions threatened to extinguish the economic base of Chile's historic elites.26
The danger of revolution was the continuance of Allende in power for the
full six years of his elected period, by the end of which the socialization of
the economy might have eroded the elites' property and income to the point
of leaving them with nothing more than prestigious names.
To halt the threats of successful insurrection the Uruguayan military
staged a coup in 1973, and the Argentine armed forces followed in 1976, in
order to prosecute the war against subversion without the impediment of ci-
vilian control.27 To prevent the success of Allende's socialist project the
Chilean military overthrew him in 1973.2" So was born the "antirevolution-
ary military regime," a new creation that spawned the tragic human rights
record of the Southern Cone.29
What was different about these new-style military governments? What
set them off from the traditional, commonplace Latin American military
government? It was their dedication to destroying and then rebuilding their
countries' political and economic systems, to staying in power long enough
not only to eliminate the current threat to capitalism and the elites, but to
transform their countries so thoroughly that the threat of revolution would be
eliminated permanently. In Argentina, the generals' "process of national re-
construction" signified "the final closing of a historic cycle and the opening
of a new one whose fundamental characteristics will be manifested by the
reorganization of the nation.' Across the Andes, the Chilean junta refused
to "set timetables for their management of the government, because the task
of rebuilding the country morally, institutionally, and economically requires
prolonged and profound actions.""
25. See STEFAN DE VYLDER, ALLENDE'S CHILE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR 23-40 (1976); PAUL E. SIGMUND, THE OVERTHROW OF
ALLENDE AND THE POLITICS OF CHILE, 1964-1976, at 77-127 (1977).
26. See SIGMUND, supra note 25, at 128-87.
27. See EDY KAUFMAN, URUGUAY IN TRANSmON: FROM CIVILIAN TO MILITARY RULE 55-
92 (1979); DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1982: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO THE
FALKLANDS WAR 355-76 (1985).
28. See ARTURO VALENZUELA, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CHILE 81-
110 (1978); SIGMUND, supra note 25, at 202-47.
29. The patterns of systematic repression and institutionalization of human rights viola-
tions found in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile in the 1970s actually were pioneered in Brazil
following the March 1964 military coup. See WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 155-74. In contrast to
the above cases, however, the Brazilian authoritarian state evolved slowly and did not acquire
the extreme characteristics of the other three, especially those of Argentina and Chile. See id.
30. BRIAN LOVEMAN & THOMAS M. DAVIES, JR., THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS: THE
MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 178 (1978) (quoting the Junta's proclamation of Mar. 25, 1976).
31. Genaro Arriagada Herrera, The Legal and Institutional Framework of the Armed
2000]
7
Wright: Human Rights in Latin America: History and Projections for the Tw
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
310 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
This was a monumental task. In the political realm, it entailed eradicat-
ing the left as well as the moderate, nonrevolutionary political groups, whose
commitment to democracy and individual liberties the military blamed for
allowing the rise of Marxists. It involved also a concerted reshaping of na-
tional history and mythology through reformulating school curricula and
strictly controlling information so that the values of family, religion, class
harmony, and fatherland could be instilled to replace concepts of democracy,
free thought, and class struggle. The Chilean junta proclaimed as one of its
duties "to change the mentality of Chileans."3' To accomplish these ambi-
tious goals a totalitarianizing ethic was required; voices of dissent and alter-
nate views could not be tolerated.
In the economic realm, the task was to promote rapid development so as
to eliminate the poverty upon which revolution was thought to prey. The
modus operandi was neoliberalism, featuring a reversal of fifty years or
more of state-led development and economic nationalism. This entailed
opening the national economies to the world economy by reducing tariffs
and pursuing foreign investment, while also selling state enterprises, cutting
budgets, and reducing or eliminating social programs." This was to be done
by shock treatments whose social result was massive unemployment and re-
duced wages for those still employed.' Stripped of political and union repre-
sentation workers were helpless to resist these "reforms."
The dual objectives of political cleansing and economic makeover re-
quired a heavy hand; neither could be carried out by a civilian, reasonably
democratic government. In order first to dispatch the immediate threats of
revolution and then to proceed with the reinvention of their countries, the
militaries determined that they would brook no opposition. They therefore
decided to set aside all constraints on their options for exercising control. In
practice, the Southern Cone dictatorships employed all known forms of re-
pression, amounting to state terror, to accomplish their missions."
The Chilean and Argentine dictatorships were the most extreme. In
Chile, the military deemed leftists guilty of crimes ex post facto-
particularly the crime of membership or leadership in the banned political,
union, and student organizations that had supported the Allende govern-
ment. 6 The DINA, a secret police that reported directly to General Augusto
Pinochet, hunted down, arrested, and killed leftists." It established a number
of specialized torture centers, including the infamous Villa Grimaldi, where
Forces in Chile, in MILITARY RULE IN CHILE: DICTATORSHIP AND OPPOSITIONS 119-20 (J.
Samuel Valenzuela & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1986).
32. Id.
33. See CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 1, at 166-198.
34. See id. at 222-246.
35. See ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 142-294; HODGES, supra note 12, at 124-94;
CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 1.
36. See CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 1.
37. See id.
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the persecuted faced their greatest nightmare." Some 200,000 Chileans, or
approximately 2 percent of the population, were driven into exile, and at
least 3,000 people were killed or disappeared during the sixteen and a half
year Pinochet dictatorship.39
In Argentina, the "dirty war" against the left was on a larger scale. Fac-
ing an actual guerrilla war, the Argentine military cracked down hard on the
insurgents. But it went much further, extending the repression to real, pre-
sumed, and even possible collaborators and sympathizers of the armed insur-
rectionaries. General Ram6n Camps laid out this strategy: "First, we will kill
the guerrillas. Then, we will kill the guerrillas' families. Then we will kill
the friends of their families, and the friends of their friends, so that there will
be no one left to remember who the guerrillas were."' In pursuit of this ap-
proach, the armed forces set up some 340 secret detention centers across the
country, most of them equipped for torture; one of the favored methods of
killing leftists was dropping them, still alive, into the ocean from airplanes.'
Pregnant women prisoners were often held until they gave birth, then were
killed and their babies given to childless military couples. ' The harvest of
the dirty war was nearly 10,000 people disappeared according to the official
inquiry conducted after the restoration of civilian government, but according
to human rights groups the figure was some 30,000."' Summing up the hor-
rors, the introduction to the government's inquiry report stated: "The enor-
mity of what took place in Argentina... is sure... to produce that disbelief
which some used at the time to defend themselves from pain and horror.""
V. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CIVIL WARS
The deplorable human rights situation in Central America from the
1970s into the 1990s, and particularly in the 1980s, also derived from an in-
tensification of sociopolitical conflict and a perception of threats of success-
ful revolution. In Central America, the lingering influence of the Cuban
Revolution was greatly reinforced by the inspiration for change coming from
Nicaragua, where the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) took
power in July 1979 after an eighteen-year struggle to overthrow the Somoza
38. See id.
39. See THOMAS C. WRIGHT & RODY Of4ATE, FLIGHT FROM CHILE: VOICES OF ExILE 8-10
(Irene B. Hodgson trans., 1998); Clifford Krauss, Chilean Military Faces Reckoning for Its
Dark Past, N.Y. TtMES, October 3, 1999, atl.
40. Judith Laikin Elkin, Recoleta: Civilization and Barbarism in Argentina, 27 MICH. Q.
REV. 235 (1988).
41. See ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 205-13.
42. See MARGUERITE GUZMAN BOUVARD, REVOLUTIONIZING MOTHERHOOD: THE
MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO 38, 94 (1994).
43. See id. at 31.
44. Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to NUNCA MkS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED 9 (1986).
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family dynasty.45 Similar to the Cuban Revolution twenty years earlier, the
Sandinistas provided models for insurrection and for revolutionary change,
designed to benefit the masses of Central America's poor. The countries
where sociopolitical conflict escalated most and where human rights abuses
became most institutionalized and brutal were Guatemala and El Salvador.
In those two countries the small elites who dominated politics had re-
sisted growing pressure for peaceful reform through the ballot box by em-
ploying military governments or, as in El Salvador in 1972 and 1977, by
simple electoral fraud carried out to thwart reform." As a result, those com-
mitted to even moderate reforms received the clear message that the only
means open to them was armed insurrection. Thus, when the Sandinistas tri-
umphed, opposition factions in Central America were encouraged in the be-
lief that successful insurrection, the only option for social change, was pos-
sible. The escalation of insurgency in Guatemala followed, and in El
Salvador the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN)
stepped up its actions significantly in 1980.""
The human rights violations that followed, as in the cases of the South-
ern Cone countries, were of course not exclusively the work of governments.
But counterinsurgency in Guatemala and El Salvador involved human rights
violations on a particularly massive scale, due not only to the escalation of
sociopolitical conflict, but also to the fact that the rebels--even when sig-
nificant numbers of them were of the ethnic and cultural mainstream-were
identified with the lower orders." When dealing with Indians and Mestizos it
was acceptable to employ death squads to conduct violence, torture, massa-
cres, and scorched earth policies."9 Why, after all, would one dignify a mem-
ber of the lower orders in Guatemala or El Salvador with formal detention,
courts martial, or forced exile, when a murder or a village massacre would
be more efficient and provide a more compelling lesson to potential anti-
government activists?
The results of the repression in Guatemala and El Salvador were stag-
gering. In Guatemala, some 150,000 people, primarily nonbelligerent Mayan
peasants, were killed between the early 1970s and the 1996 peace accord-
most of them in the 1980s.' Over a million more were forced to flee their
45. See JOHN A. BOOTH, THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION
97-183 (2nd ed. 1985).
46. See WALTER LA FEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL
AMERICA 147-270 (2nd ed. 1993); JOHN A. BooTH & THOMAS W. WALKER, UNDERSTANDING
CENTRAL AMERICA 1-60, 91-115 (2nd ed. 1993).
47. See SUSANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE OF GUATEMALA: REBELS, DEATH SQUADS, AND
U.S. POWER 131-44 (1991); TOMMIE SUE MONTGOMERY, REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR:
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 119-84 (1982).
48. See JONAS, supra note 47, at 145-59; AMERICAS WATCH, EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF
TERROR: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF ARCHBISHOP ROMERO 47-63 (1991).
49. See JONAS, supra note 47, at 103-13, 145-59; AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 48.
50. See JONAS, supra note 47, at 149.
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villages and homes." As in Guatemala, the military and paramilitary forces
in El Salvador massacred entire populations of villages, as in the well-known
case of El Mozote52 in 1981, while also murdering among groups suspected
of leftist sympathies, such as the six Jesuits killed in 1989."3 The United
States government, under President Ronald Reagan, offered its unwavering
support to the Salvadoran military.54 The United States financed and advised
it, and trained its killers, including the notorious Atlacatl rapid response bat-
talion," which sowed terror on behalf of the state.
VI. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights56 re-
flected a political compromise between the Western capitalist democracies
and the Soviet Union and its allies. By including the basic values of both
systems-the individual liberties dear to the West and the economic, social,
and cultural human rights fundamental to the socialist world-the document
laid out a comprehensive and utopian vision of the fundamental rights of
humankind that no one country has enacted in the half century since the
agreement was reached.57
With the exceptions to be noted, economic and social human rights in
Latin America have not achieved top billing. Rather, following in the West-
ern tradition, the countries have consistently proclaimed the primacy of indi-
vidual liberties and have left economic and social matters to the political
process. 58 Thus, the economic and social gains of Latin America's disadvan-
taged groups-workers, peasants, and initially the middle class-have re-
sulted from political struggle or from preemptive measures adopted by popu-
list leaders to gain mass followings.
The achievement of economic and social benefits occurred essentially
51. See id.
52. The massacre at El Mozote, in which up to 1,000 men, women, and children were
killed in a ten day period, produced the largest civilian death toll in a single episode of the
Salvadoran war. See generally MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE: A PARABLE OF
THE COLD WAR (1994).
53. On November 16, 1989, soldiers entered the Jesuit-run University of Central Amer-
ica in San Salvador and murdered six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter. This event
was central in turning U. S. public opinion against continued support of the Salvadoran mili-
tary. See generally MARTHA DOGGETT, DEATH FORETOLD: THE JESUIT MURDERS IN EL
SALVADOR (1993).
54. See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 48, at 117-37.
55. The Atlacatl rapid response battalion, a counterinsurgency unit trained by U.S. per-
sonnel, was implicated in the massacre at El Mozote, the deaths of the six Jesuits, and other
atrocities. See generally DANNER, supra note 52; DOGGETT, supra note 53.
56. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
67th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
57. See id.
58. See GERALD E. FITZGERALD, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LATIN AMERICA (Gerald E. Fitz-
gerald ed., 1968).
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during the period between World War I and the mid-1970s.' Created by
Latin America's economic modernization in the late nineteenth century, the
new industrial-type working class began to organize labor unions and politi-
cal parties to represent its interests by the turn of the century.' This process
took place first in the larger and more developed countries, such as Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile."' These countries established considerable in-
frastructure for exports and manufacturing, thus creating significant sectors
of skilled and unskilled labor.' Met initially by repression, these groups be-
gan to achieve some successes in the economic crises touched off by the
successive disruptions of the world economy in World War I and the Great
Depression.63 Thus, from the late 1920s, labor codes regulating unionization
and working conditions began to appear, and leftist parties representing
workers' interests began to become integrated, often precariously, into the
political process."
Similarly, Latin America's economic modernization led to the growth
and transformation of the previously tiny middle class, as white-collar jobs
proliferated in the export and domestic commercial sectors, in the bureauc-
racy, and in the expanding educational field.6' While less inclined to union-
ize, the middle classes nonetheless pursued their interests through interest
associations and political parties." Often allied with workers in pursuit of
common interests in the elite-dominated political systems, they sought, and
increasingly obtained, social security systems and increased government in-
vestment in education and public sector jobs. 7 Middle class parties were
more easily integrated into national politics than were the working class par-
ties and in the more developed countries achieved major influence from the
1910s onward."
Mexico offers a noteworthy case of the early acquisition of formal eco-
nomic and social rights by the working and middle classes, and even the
peasantry. In 1917 Mexico adopted what was arguably the world's most ad-
vanced constitution-a document that reflected compromises among the
various factions that had fought in the great revolution of 1910, first against
the long-term dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz and then among themselves for
supremacy in post-Diaz Mexico.' While reaffirming the individual liberties
59. See Roxborough, supra note 9.
60. See ALBA, supra note 5, at 25-34, 201-316.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See JOHN J. JOHNSON, POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF
THE MIDDLE SECTORS 1-44 (1958).
66. See id. at 45-179.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See E.V. NIEMEYER, JR., REVOLUTION AT QUERETARO: THE MEXICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1916-1917, at 3-30 (1974).
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imbedded in the prior 1857 Constitution, the 1917 document contained arti-
cles that committed the state to a process of social engineering. 0 Article 123
spelled out the right of workers to the protection of a labor code that would
address union rights, working conditions, remuneration, and benefits."' Sev-
eral provisions committed the state to public education. Article 27 limited
rural properties to only two types-the ejido, or traditional communal vil-
lage with pre-Columbian roots, and small property, to be defined by law-
and thus committed the state to an agrarian reform designed to eliminate the
large hacienda and replace it with communal farming and individual small-
holders." Students of Mexican history know that the implementation of these
revolutionary provisions was halting and incomplete. Yet this 1917 Constitu-
tion not only provided guidance for Mexican policy for the next 75 years or
so, but also established an agenda for reformers in other Latin American
countries who saw in the document a set of goals adaptable to their coun-
tries.
While working and middle class groups in the more developed countries
had acquired the power to achieve and defend some of their most important
goals, their counterparts in the smaller, less industrialized countries of Cen-
tral America, .the Caribbean, and the Andean region lagged behind. Even in
the countries where significant economic and social legislation had been
achieved, major sectors of the working class were left out of the benefits. As
late as the 1970s, only unionized workers normally enjoyed reasonable
working conditions, compensation, and retirement benefits, and with the ex-
ceptions of Uruguay and Argentina, unions encompassed only a small pro-
portion of the nonagricultural labor force.73 Even more glaring was the con-
tinued marginalization of Latin America's rural workers, most of whom not
only lacked land, but worked at the dictates of the patr6n (boss) without the
possibility of either union or political representation." Only in Mexico and
Bolivia, where land ownership gave them some political power, and begin-
ning in the 1960s in Cuba, Chile, Venezuela, and later in Nicaragua, did the
rural poor gain any economic or social rights from the landowning sectors. 5
It was not until the Cuban Constitution of 1976 that a Latin American
country would fully and formally embrace the economic, social, and cultural
rights enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
Adopted seventeen years after Fidel Castro assumed power, the document
70. See id.
71. See MEX. CONST. art. 123.
72. See id. art. 27.
73. See Roxborough, supra note 9.
74. See ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 86-98 (1974);
RoDoLFo STAVENHAGEN, AGRARIAN PROBLEMS AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
559-83 (1970).
75. See ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 86-98.
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
67th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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enumerated fundamental economic, social, and cultural human rights: "Work
in a socialist society is a right and a duty and a source of pride for every citi-
zen; 77 "All those who work have the right to rest, which is guaranteed by
the eight-hour workday, a weekly rest period and annual paid vacations;""8
"By means of the Social Security System the state assures adequate protec-
tion to every worker who is unable to work because of age, illness or disabil-
ity;" 9 "Everybody has the right to health protection and care;.8 "Everyone
has the right to an education."'" While these rights are unqualified, the Con-
stitution places limitations on enumerated individual rights of speech, asso-
ciation, and religion, culminating in a comprehensive caveat: "None of the
freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to what
is established in the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence
and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban
people to build socialism and communism."82 The 1976 Constitution was a
faithful reflection of both the achievements and the limitations of the Cuban
Revolution.
The other country to enshrine economic, social, and cultural human
rights in a constitution was Nicaragua. The 1987 Constitution, adopted dur-
ing the Sandinistas' rule, defined Nicaragua as a social democracy with
enumerated economic, social, and cultural rights.83 Unlike the Cuban Consti-
tution, however, the Nicaraguan document guaranteed individual liberties
without qualifications in a system of political pluralism." The prolonged
Contra War and the eventual defeat of the Sandinistas," however, prevented
full implementation of this Constitution that modeled itself on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in seeking the best of both concepts of human
rights for the people of Nicaragua.
Imperfect and limited as they were outside of Cuba, the economic and
social rights gained from political struggle in Latin America began to un-
ravel in the 1970s. First, labeling them subversive, communist, or antipatri-
otic, the Southern Cone military dictatorships destroyed both the political
parties and the unions through which the working and middle classes and the
77. CUBA CONST. art. 44.
78. Id. art. 45.
79. Id. art. 46.
80. Id. art. 49.
81. Id. art. 50.
82. Id. art. 61.
83. See NICA. CONST. arts. 56-91.
84. See NICA. CONST. arts. 23-55.
85. The Sandinistas were defeated in the 1990 election after the long Washington-
financed and directed Contra War had required the government to institute a military draft and
divert much of the national budget to defense, while soldiers and civilians alike sustained ex-
tremely high casualty rates. See E. BRADFORD BURNS, AT WAR WITH NICARAGUA: THE
REAGAN DOCTRINE AND THE POLInCS OF NOSTALGIA 29-79 (1987); DAVID CLOSE,
NICARAGUA: THE CHAMORRO YEARS 27-32 (1999). See generally THOMAS W. WALKER,
REAGAN VERSUS THE SANDINISTAS: THE UNDECLARED WAR ON NICARAGUA (Thomas W.
Walker ed., 1987).
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peasants had accomplished their gains. In Central America, where the ad-
vances made in economic and social rights had been much more limited, the
regimes in Guatemala and El Salvador linked unions and reformist parties
with insurrection and reversed the little progress that had been made. From
the 1980s to the present, the adoption of neoliberal economic policies
throughout Latin America has further eroded the economic and social con-
quests of the previous half century.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW ERA OF DEMOCRACY: THE 1990S AND INTO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The backdrop to the human rights abuses of the 1970s and 1980s was
the conviction held by the elites, and shared by the command levels of the
armed forces, that total war was necessary and justifiable to preserve the tra-
ditional way of life.86 No holds would be barred in the fight against godless
Marxism. The institutionalization of human rights abuses-massive deten-
tions, torture, massacres, murders, disappearances-was a tool to roll back
the threat of revolution. Thus, state terror became the norm in important
parts of Latin America.
By the early 1990s, the threat of revolution was over. The period of the
Cuban Revolution's greatest potency as a catalyst of revolutionary activity
had been the 1960s. Castro's influence began to wane in the 1970s, but it
continued into the 1980s, particularly in Central America. Then, a series of
developments in the early 1990s signaled the end of the era of the Cuban
Revolution. Between 1989 and 1991 the fall of the Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Cuba of its
primary allies and crucial economic support.87 Two hemispheric events of
1990 were milestones of different sorts. The Sandinistas' electoral defeat
ended the only revolutionary government to seize power through insurrec-
tion since Cuba' s, and the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile closed
out the long phase of the repressive military dictatorships set up to combat
Cuban style revolution. 9 That "something new, exciting, dangerous, and in-
fectious" that Herbert Matthews had detected at the beginning of the 1960s
was gone.' The situation was exactly the reverse of that thirty years earlier.
Having placed the United States and the Latin American elites on the defen-
86. See generally KAREN REMMER, MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA (1989); DAVID
COLLIER ET AL., THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA (David Collier ed., 1979).
87. See Jorge I. Dominguez, The Political Impact on Cuba of the Reform and Collapse of
Communist Regimes, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR 99-132 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993);
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the
USSR and Eastern Europe, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra, at 133-96.
88. See THOMAS W. WALKER, NICARAGUA WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: REGIME TRANSITION
AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE 1990S, at 1-19 (1997).
89. See MARY HELEN SPOONER, SOLDIERS IN A NARROW LAND: THE PINOCHET REGIME IN
CHILE 223-67 (1994).
90. MAITHEWS, supra note 13, at 185.
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sive in the early years of his revolution, Fidel Castro was on the defensive in
the 1990s, fighting for the survival of his revolution in the post-Soviet world.
With the decline of pressures for revolution, the period of reaction be-
gan to wane in the 1980s. Argentina returned to civilian rule in 1983 and
Uruguay in 1985."' Chile followed suit in 1990,' and the civil wars in El
Salvador and Guatemala ended through negotiation in 1992 and 1996, re-
spectively.93 The passing of the era of revolution and reaction gave rise to a
new period of democracy that has continued into the first year of the twenty-
first century.9 '
The decade of the 1990s was a unique period in Latin American history.
With the exceptions of Cuba and Haiti, elected civilian governments held
uninterrupted sway throughout the region. Latin America's trend toward
democratic government was part of a global "wave" of democratization,
which began in 1974 and accelerated in the 1990s following the end of the
Eastern European communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia. During this period, Latin America progressed from
having only four democracies, defined as countries with governments se-
lected by "free, open, and fair elections," to 18 democratic or democratizing
countries in 1990." Given the lack of strong democratic traditions, institu-
tions, and political cultures in many Latin American counties, the persistence
of democracy through the 1990s was remarkable.
In the new era of democracy, respect for human rights in Latin Amer-
ica-understood as individual liberties-has vastly improved. The return of
democratic government had resulted from the subsidence of the social and
political conflict unleashed by the Cuban Revolution, and with the ascen-
dancy of elected, constitutional governments, improvement in the human
rights climate could be expected. Beyond that, as a legacy of the dark days,
vigorous human rights movements continue to monitor the situation and seek
redress for the victims of human rights abuses and their families. Some
countries, including Brazil and Argentina, adopted new constitutions that in-
corporated provisions to strengthen human rights." Rigoberta Menchi, a
Mayan woman from Guatemala, received the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize for her
91. See Edward C. Epstein, Democracy in Argentina, in THE NEW ARGENTINA
DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSFUL FORMULA 12-13 (Edward C. Epstein ed., 1992);
MARTIN WEINSTEIN, URUGUAY: DEMOCRACY AT THE CROSSROADS 74-92 (1988).
92. See SPOONER, supra note 89.
93. See TOMMIE SUE MONTGOMERY, REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR: FROM CIVIL STRIFE
TO CIVIL PEACE 215-48 (2nd ed. 1995); Rachel Seider, Conclusions, in GUATEMALA AFTER
THE PEACE ACCORDS 245-46 (Rachel Sieder ed., 1998).
94. It should be noted, however, that a military-civilian uprising in January 2000 ousted
Ecuador's president, Jamil Mahuad. See John Otis, Ecuador's Military Got More from Coup
than Change at Top, HOUST. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2000, at 9. He was replaced by the vice-
president, Pedro Pinto. See id.
95. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (1991).
96. See CONST. AI G. arts. 36-43; C.F. arts. 5-11 (Braz.).
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work publicizing the horrors of the Guatemalan repression.97 Things changed
even in Cuba. In the 1990s, human rights groups advocating individual liber-
ties and democracy grew in number and militancy.98 Meanwhile, Castro's
ability to guarantee the economic and social human rights that were the
hallmark of his revolution eroded in the face of economic crisis and con-
comitant economic restructuring, which reintroduced major social differen-
tiation and privilege in a society modeled on egalitarianism."
At the dawn of the new millennium, respect for human rights is more
firmly entrenched than ever in Latin America's history. Yet the democracy
within which the free exercise of human rights is imbedded is not beyond
challenge. Despite Latin America's impressive record of democratization,
the persistence of elected civilian governments through the 1990s, and the
emergence of a new official culture of democracy, obstacles remain to the
consolidation and continuation of the new political order. National recon-
ciliation in the aftermath of the Southern Cone dictatorships and the Central
American civil wars continues to bedevil some countries."° Guerrilla war-
fare, with its destabilizing effects, is alive in Mexico and Peru, and flourish-
ing in Colombia.' The question of indigenous rights, catalyzed by the quin-
centennial of the "discovery" of America, adds a destabilizing issue as
militant native movements have arisen in virtually every country, from Mex-
ico to Chile, that has a significant Indian population."°
Perhaps the foremost obstacle to democratic continuity is the new Latin
American political economy that had become entrenched by the 1990s. Dur-
ing the world recession of the 1980s many Latin American countries faced
the prospect of defaulting on massive foreign debts they had incurred during
the previous decade. 3 They became dependent on emergency loans and
hence on the terms dictated by the international lending agencies, particu-
97. See Indian Accepts Nobel Peace Prize, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Dec. 11, 1992, at 14A.
See generally RIGOBERTA MENCHU: AN INDIAN WOMAN IN GUATEMALA (Ann Wright trans.,
1984).
98. See AGUILA, supra note 14, 196-203.
99. See NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, 32 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
16-47 (1999).
100. See ALEXANDRA BARAHONA DE BRITO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN
URUGUAY AND CHILE 125-212 (1997); J. PATRICE MCSHERRY, INCOMPLETE TRANSITION:
MILITARY POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 1-27 (1997); Rachel Seider, Conclusions,
in GUATEMALA AFTER THE PEACE ACCORDS, supra note 93, at 246-53.
101. See generally NEIL HARVEY, THE CHIAPAS REBELLION: THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND
AND DEMOCRACY (1998); STEVE J. STERN, SHINING AND OTHER PATHS: WAR AND SOCIETY IN
PERU, 1980-1995 (Steve J. Stem ed., 1998); Ricardo Vargas Meza, The FARC: The War and
the Crisis of the State, in 31 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 22-27 (1998); Colombia Re-
port (last modified April 21, 2000) <www.colombiareport.org>.
102. See Deborah J. Yashar, Indigenous Protest and Democracy in Latin America, in
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE
1990s, at 87-105, 116-122 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Abraham F. Lowenthal eds., 1996).
103. See German Sanchez Otero, Neoliberalism and Its Discontents, in LATIN AMERICA:
A NACLA (NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA) READER 120-26 (Fred Rosen &
Deidre Mcfadyen eds., 1995).
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larly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The standard
neoliberal "Washington formula" was applied in country after country: fiscal
austerity to balance budgets; the opening of closed economies to world mar-
kets and foreign investment; and privatization of state-owned assets."°
Mexican President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Argentine President Car-
los Menem (1990-2000) set the pace, while in virtually every country, budg-
ets and government services shrank, tariffs fell, and transnational corpora-
tions and national conglomerates bought up the public sector: airlines,
railroads, utilities, communications, natural resources, manufacturing, and
more. 105
Latin America's economic contraction in the "lost decade" of the 1980s
had severe human consequences as declining employment, real wages, and
living standards jeopardized, or even erased, decades of gains by the work-
ing and middle classes."° Growth resumed in the 1990s, but in most coun-
tries it was erratic, and the new economy produced few well-paying jobs.
Job growth was primarily in low-paying service positions and in the infor-
mal sector, and thus it failed to ameliorate the decline in living standards."c
In this period of heightened need, cutbacks in government spending on
health, education, and food and transportation subsidies have been particu-
larly onerous.
The results of these economic problems and neoliberal policies have
been a dramatic erosion of the economic and social conquests that the Latin
American middle and working classes, and secondarily the rural poor, had
achieved throughout much of the twentieth century. Reflecting this reversal
is a significant increase in the number and percentage of Latin Americans
living in poverty and a redistribution of income and wealth in favor of the
elites. The World Bank reported that in 1993, 110 million Latin Americans,
or a quarter of the region's population, lived on less than one dollar per
day. ' 8 Further, this marginalized sector had grown by twenty percent since
1987, a rate of impoverishment exceeded during the same period only by
Sub-Saharan Africa and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe
and Central Asia."° Income distribution figures confirm that the burden of
the new economic order rests squarely on the poor and the politically weak,
and these trends have not been reversed.
The deteriorating conditions of Latin America's middle classes, work-
104. See id.
105. See John Weiss, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico: The Liberalism Experiment, in
DISMANTLING THE MEXICAN STATE? 58-77 (Rob Aiken et al. eds., 1996); Juan Carlos Torre,
Critical Junctures and Economic Change: Launching Market Reforms in Argentina, in
ARGENTINA: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNIZATION 201-16 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Allison M.
Garland eds., 1998).
106. See HOWARD J. WIARDA, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS: A NEW WORLD OF
POssIBIlrv 179-82 (1995).
107. See NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 14-27.
108. Trends in Poverty, POVERTY UPDATE (World Bank, Wash., D.C.), 1999, at 1.
109. See id.
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ers, and peasants have not gone unnoticed. A number of voices arose in the
1990s to condemn neoliberalism as responsible for impoverishment and
marginalization, among them the Latin American Council of Bishops, which
denounced "economism," or "the absolutizing of market forces and the
power of money, forgetting that the economy is to be at the service of the
people and not the other way around.""' Hugo Chdvez, Venezuela's flam-
boyant president, was elected in 1999 on a stridently antineoliberal plat-
form."' Even the World Bank, having discovered the extent of poverty in
Latin America and the developing world, was recommending strong meas-
ures to reverse the damage done by the very neoliberal policies of which it
had been the architect."2
In the views of many critics, neoliberalism is responsible not only for
deteriorating economic and social conditions, but also for endangering the
continuation of Latin America's new era of democracy."3 The generalized
poverty, the loss of socioeconomic gains made by the working and middle
classes, and the widening gap between rich and poor, inevitably breed cyni-
cism toward the political system and threaten its legitimacy. Mexican author
and critic Carlos Fuentes warns of the fragility of democracy in the neolib-
eral economic order: "Wherever there are democratic institutions, the ex-
cesses of neoliberal policies can lead, by many paths, either to popular upris-
ings or to military coups."'" 4
CONCLUSION
Latin America's democratization, and the persistence of democratic
government through the 1990s and into the new century, are remarkable
achievements. Yet if the present economic panorama does not change for the
better, heightened social and political conflict could ensue, as Fuentes pro-
jects. Should that occur, both democracy and today's improved human rights
climate would be threatened. Despite strengthened constitutional protections
in some countries, the existence of vigorous human rights movements, and
the resolve to avoid a repetition of the 1970s and 1980s that is reflected in
the title of the Argentine government report on disappearances-nunca mds
(never again)-respect for human rights in Latin America in the twenty-first
century cannot be taken for granted.
110. See WALKER, supra note 88, at 300.
111. See NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 11-15.
112. See Latest World Bank Poverty Update Shows Urgent Need to Better Shield Poor in
Crises, NEWS RELEASE No. 99/2214/S (WORLD BANK, Wash., D.C.).
113. See ATILIo A. BORON, STATE, CAPITALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
189-220 (1995); Philip Oxhoer & Graciela Ducatenzeiler, The Problematic Relationship Be-
tween Economic and Political Liberalization: Some Theoretical Considerations, in MARKETS
AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: CONFLICT OR CONVERGENCE? 13-41 (Philip Oxhom &
Pamela K. Starr eds., 1999).
114. CARLOS FUENTES, A NEW TIME FOR MEXICO 110 (Carlos Fuentes & Marina Gutman
Castafieda trans., 1996).
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